

(COPY)

DFEE16/540

UK UNCLASSIFIED

BR/79

PERSONAL MESSAGE DATED 8TH JULY FOR
MR. HERRIES FROM SIR ANTHONY EDEN

I am most grateful for your agreement in principle to a further atomic test in Monte Belle Island. This will allow our plans to go ahead at full speed.

I know well the strain which is being thrown on your resources not least by the help which you are already giving us at Haveling and Hazelings. The total resources required for this test will, however, be only about ten per cent. of those used in OPERATION MERRICANE and our needs will be relatively modest.

We shall be ready shortly to send a party of officials for detailed discussions and suggest subject to your views that they should leave here on the 10th July and arrive in Australia on the 22nd July. They will be headed by Captain H.C. Martell, R.N., who will be in charge of the Naval side of the Operation and will include Mr. C.A. Adams representing Sir William Penney, Group Captain S.W.B. Kennel, Lieut.-Commander A.R. Bettle and Lieut.-Commander R.R. Vetherington. Ministry of Supply and Treasury representatives in Australia will join up with them and will be able to discuss administrative and financial matters.

I assure you that safety measures will be most meticulously carried out and that as before we should welcome discussions on safety checks with your scientists. We shall be glad to have some senior Australian Service officers as observers. Accommodation which is only serious practical difficulty can be discussed at later stage with our officials.

Planning at this stage will be the responsibility of the Executive that has been set up to plan OPERATION "BUFFALO" at Haveling. I suggest that the matter should now be pursued by them direct with whoever you wish to nominate. Will you let us know with whom you would wish us to deal?

Copied to PM+C
20/2/85 B

UK UNCLASSIFIED

10-1
The Secretary,
Department of Defence,
Melbourne.

DC KC 23-26 JUL 1956 Prime Minister's Department.
447/23

BR/79

447/23

UK UNCLASSIFIED *AB*

BR/79

Referred for information.

(Sgd.) E.J. Bunting.
Acting Secretary.
6/7/1956.

P.M.'s. File 449/23.

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
Canberra.
4th July, 1956.

POL 60/2
[Redacted]

Sir,

I am directed by the High Commissioner to refer to my letter No. POL 60/2 of the 3rd July about Operation Buffalo. *Not in file.*

The Australian authorities are doubtless aware of the broad outline of the United Kingdom's intentions for this operation through the discussions in the Atomic Weapons Tests Committee (late Maralinga Committee) and also through the Safety Committee. They have not, however, been informed officially of the United Kingdom's plans and I am, therefore, instructed to let you know that the United Kingdom authorities propose to carry out the following explosions, subject, of course, to the agreement in detail of the Australian Safety Committee:

A. Main trials

There will be four devices to be exploded:

- Round 1 on a 100 foot tower
- Round 2 on the ground
- Round 3 on a 100 foot tower
- Round 4 airburst at 1200 feet

B. Subsidiary tests

About ten rounds of HE assemblies in TIM series for timing and similar measurements.

These assemblies contain non-fissile radioactive components and therefore give rise to a small amount of contamination. These will be closely comparable to two firings at Maralinga in July 1955, which were referred to in my letter No. J.802/1 of the 24th March 1955 to Mr. Foxcroft.

The High Commissioner has also been informed that Sir W. Penney is preparing further details for transmission to the Safety Committee.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) A.G.R. Rouse.

The Acting Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department.

UK UNCLASSIFIED *AB*

UK UNCLASSIFIED *SB*

BR/79

BR/79

COPY

UK UNCLASSIFIED *SB*

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
Canberra.

POL 60/1.

8th June, 1956.

Sir,

I am directed by the High Commissioner to refer to my letter No. POL 60/1 of the 7th June and to say it is regretted that the text of the second paragraph of the Prime Minister's announcement was unfortunately not received in advance.

.....
For your information, however, the text of this second paragraph, together with that of a supplementary question and answer, is now attached. The High Commissioner has also asked me to say that the following sentence was added to the first paragraph as given in my letter under reference :-

"We are most grateful for this".

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

A.G.R. Rouse.

The Acting Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

COPY: Sir Arthur Fadden
Sir Philip McBride
Mr. Beale
Sir Frederick Shedden
F.A. O'Connor

UK UNCLASSIFIED *SB*

has been read."

██████████
UK UNCLASSIFIED

BR179
449/63.

Prime Minister's Department,
Canberra. A.C.T.

The Secretary,
Department of Defence.

Referred in connection with previous correspondence.

(Sgd.) E.J. Bunting.
Acting Secretary.
6 June 1956.

Copy No. 4.

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom, Canberra.
5th June, 1956.

POL 60/1
██████████

My dear Acting Prime Minister,

I have been asked to inform you of the following in connection with the full scale atomic tests which are to take place in the Pacific next year. It was intended that a press announcement about these tests should be issued in the United Kingdom on the 27th May. It was subsequently decided that the announcement should not be made until sometime during the current week. The text of this statement and the decision to delay its release were communicated to the Australian authorities through the Prime Minister's Department. I am now requested to tell you in the strictest confidence of the reason for the postponement.

The press announcement has been held up while United Kingdom Ministers considered the report of a Special Committee of the Medical Research Council insofar as it concerns hazards from fall-out from test explosions. The conclusions of the Report, which will be published as a Command Paper on the 12th June, will be more reassuring on genetic effects than public opinion has anticipated. The present and foreseeable damage from external radiation to be expected from fall-out consequent upon weapon tests is negligible. The Report does, however, draw attention to possible dangers arising from internal radiation due to the release in the test explosions of radio-active strontium on which the conclusion is as follows:-

"At its present level no detectable increase in the incidence of ill-effects is to be expected. Nevertheless recognising all the inadequacy of our present knowledge we cannot ignore the possibility that if the rate of firing increases and particularly if greater numbers of thermo-nuclear weapons are used, we could within the lifetime of some now living be approaching levels at which ill effects might be produced in a small number of the population."

The Rt. Hon. Sir Arthur Fadden, KCMG. MP.,
Acting Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

UK UNCLASSIFIED

7202 40 UK UNCLASSIFIED 22/4
[REDACTED]

- 2 -

This warning about the risk of continuing explosions, particularly if their number increases, may lead to renewed pressure for the cessation of tests. While reaffirming their intention to carry on with full scale atomic tests in the Pacific, United Kingdom Ministers consider it essential to include in the press announcement, which it is intended to issue this week, a decision to initiate further discussions on nuclear test explosions designed to lead to agreement on their control and limitation. This might take the form of an initial approach on this subject to the United States and the Soviet Union. Dependent on their reactions the matter could be pursued later, possibly in the context of the disarmament discussions.

United Kingdom Ministers feel that they cannot ignore the warnings of leading United Kingdom scientists and that a proposed limitation of future tests by agreement is the least that can be done in view of their Report.

In informing you of the above I am asked to say that the United Kingdom authorities have also told the United States Government in the strictest secrecy of their intention to announce in the press statement that the United Kingdom Government will try to secure international limitation of atomic tests. The only other Government which has been given the above mentioned information is that of New Zealand and I am requested to state that it is of the greatest importance that this matter should be kept absolutely secret until the announcement is made.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd.)

UK UNCLASSIFIED
[Signature]

Special message dated 16th May for Mr. Menzies
from Sir Anthony Eden

You know well the importance we attach to the speediest development of efficient nuclear weapons and of the great part they can play in the interests of Commonwealth strategy. Our research and development work are going so well that we hope to carry out certain experiments early in 1956 and to have a full-scale test of thermonuclear weapons in 1957.

For your strictly personal information I am consulting Holland about a possible site in the South Pacific for full-scale tests. I should like to ask for your help in making arrangements for experiments in early 1956. As you know, Maralinga cannot be ready until September-October of that year when we are already planning to carry out certain weapon trials. If we can carry out experiments in April, 1956, we shall not only save six months of valuable time in our weapon development programme but shall get greater value from the Maralinga tests in September-October.

Our people have worked out what seems to them to be the best method of carrying out these experiments and have suggested that your agreement should be sought to a programme of two firings in Monte Bello Islands in April, 1956. The experiments would consist of atomic explosions with the inclusion of light elements as a boost. It would of course be made clear in any public announcement that the explosions were atomic and not thermonuclear.

Our proposal would be that the smaller of two shots should be fired first and if this was completely successful the second and slightly larger shot would not then be fired. Neither of the two would give a yield more than two and a half times greater than that of the bomb fired in the islands in the Hurricane operation. The explosions would

UK UNCLASSIFIED *AK*

... should ...
+ ... of ...
- 2 -

UK UNCLASSIFIED
[Redacted]

on towers to reduce contamination and fall-out would be less than one fifth of that of the Hurricane bomb.

We should of course ensure that the shots would not be exploded unless conditions were such as to involve absolutely no danger to the health of people or animals on the mainland and should give your people the same facilities for checking safety measures as they had at previous trials and as they will have at Maralinga.

full
cost
support

We should be prepared to bear the cost of the operation but should be grateful for all such logistic support as Australia could provide, such as refuelling and stores, and in particular for support for the aircraft involved in measurements and for the control ship.

I am sending you now this brief summary of the proposals to seek your agreement in principle to this extra trial. If, as I hope will be the case, you find that you can agree we can arrange for more detailed discussions.

copied to Pm + C
20/2/85
87

UK UNCLASSIFIED
[Signature]

COPY

UK UNCLASSIFIED

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.
29th May, 1954.

J.802/1

Dear Brown,

The Department of Atomic Energy in the United Kingdom may decide in the light of certain researches now being undertaken that it will be necessary to conduct experiments with "initiators" some time during the year 1955. These would not be atomic bomb trials but would involve the detonation of small charges of ordinary high explosives containing some radioactive material. We understand that the object is to test the extent of ground contamination which would follow on these detonations. Similar experiments were made with six small bombs at Emu Field at the time of the atomic tests last year. Conditions in the United Kingdom for these experiments are unsuitable and it is much hoped therefore that the Australian authorities would agree to their being conducted in this country.

The site for such experiments would, of course, be entirely a matter for the Australian authorities. The permanent providing ground would not be required. We have, however, been asked to say that if the tests were to be carried out in the Coldea-Watson area, as provisionally discussed by Mr. Butement and Sir William Penney, it would be important to arrange them in such a way as to avoid prejudicing the permanent site by contamination of any ground which may be required either for it or its approaches.

If these tests proved to be necessary, and if the Australian authorities agreed that they might be conducted in Australia, it would be the intention of the Department of Atomic Energy to send about a dozen personnel from Aldermaston for the tests and it would be their hope that the Department of Supply would provide the necessary support for the trials. It would also be desirable, if this commended itself to the Australian authorities, that a scientist should be sent to Australia from the United Kingdom some time in advance to arrange the details. Liability for the whole of the expenses involved in connection with the tests would be accepted by the Department of Atomic Energy.

It will not be possible to say definitely for some few months whether "initiator" tests will be necessary in 1955. We shall, of course, let you know definitely one way or the other as soon as possible. In the meantime, however, it would be a great help to the United Kingdom authorities if you could let us know for their information whether the Australian Government would give their permission for the trials to be held in Australia.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) G.W. TORY.

UK UNCLASSIFIED Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
CANBERRA.

8th May, 1956.

Sir,

I am directed by the High Commissioner to refer to your undated letter No. 449/23 about the invitation to six United States technical observers to attend the second explosion of BUFFALO.

The High Commissioner has asked me to inform you that the United Kingdom Ministers have now approved the proposal and the United Kingdom Ambassador in Washington has been instructed to invite the United States authorities to send up to six observers (not representatives of the Press or politicians) to witness the second explosion.

Provided the Australian authorities have no objection, the United Kingdom authorities would propose to fly the United States observers from Adelaide to Maralinga where they would stay overnight after the explosion. The date given to the United States authorities is "some time in September after the first week".

As regards the question of a press release, I am asked to tell you that the United Kingdom authorities do not intend to make any announcement about this matter at present. The wish of the Australian authorities to make a simultaneous announcement in due course has, however, been noted and the United Kingdom Ambassador in Washington has been instructed to consult the United Kingdom authorities if the question of a public announcement is raised. The High Commissioner would then, of course, get in touch with you about the timing and arrangements for the announcement.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

A.G.P. House.

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

COPY: Supply
Defence

UK UNCLASSIFIED

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT

WW:YL 449/23

The Secretary,
Department of Defence.

Referred for your information, in connection with previous correspondence.

(Sd.) A.G. Brown

UK UNCLASSIFIEDOFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA.

Ref: J.804/1

30th April, 1956.

Sir,

I am directed by the High Commissioner to refer to his letter No. J.804/1 of the 24th April to the Prime Minister about full scale atomic tests in the Pacific. In that letter the High Commissioner said that he would be forwarding the information requested by Mr. Menzies regarding facilities. He has now asked me to send you this material.

As regards the point mentioned in paragraph 2 (a) of Mr. Menzies' message to Sir Anthony Eden, you will by now have received my letter No. J.804/1 of the 24th April outlining a requirement for a mooring vessel, and possibly an escort vessel, which the United Kingdom authorities hope the Royal Australian Navy may be able to provide. In addition the United Kingdom authorities would be very grateful for the use of an R.A.N. frigate or destroyer to act as a weather ship. Such a ship would need to be equipped with a 277F RADAR set and would be required during the approximate period from March to June, 1957. The United Kingdom authorities would also like short docking and refitting facilities for a LST in about January, 1957, and for a RFA in about March, 1957.

With reference to point 2 (b) in Mr. Menzies' message, I have been asked to tell you that the United Kingdom authorities would like to base 50 officers and 500 other ranks for supporting eight CANBERRA and four HASTINGS aircraft at Edinburgh airfield in support of "GRAHLE" during the period December, 1956, to August, 1957. As regards the question raised in paragraph 2 (c) of the Prime Minister's message, I am instructed to state that the United Kingdom authorities have no requirements in this respect.

Lastly on the question of the phasing of requirements at Edinburgh airfield raised in paragraph 2(d) of the message, the High Commissioner has requested me to say that this matter has been the subject of discussion by the Parliamentary Secretary to the United Kingdom Ministry of Supply.

It is hoped that the above information answers the points raised by the Prime Minister, but if any further information is required no doubt you will inform us.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Sgd.) A.C.R. ROUSE

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department.**UK UNCLASSIFIED**

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA.

BR/79

J804/1

27th April, 1956.

UK UNCLASSIFIED *JS*

Sir,

I am directed by the High Commissioner to refer to previous correspondence about full scale atomic tests in the Pacific (our reference J804/1) and to inform you that the code name for the operation (Grapple) is now unclassified and may be used freely. The nature of the operation is now graded as "Secret".

I am, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(A.G.R. Rouse)

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA.

COPY: Defence
Supply
Navy
Air

UK UNCLASSIFIED *JS*

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT

WW:YL M.217

The Secretary,
Department of Defence.

Referred for your information.

(Sgd. for) (A. S. Brown)
Secretary.

30 Apr 1956

UK UNCLASSIFIED

B/79

(COPY)

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA.

27th April, 1956.

J801/1

Sir,

I am directed by the High Commissioner to refer to previous correspondence about full scale atomic tests in the Pacific (our reference J801/1) and to inform you that the code name for the operation (Grapple) is now unclassified and may be used freely. The nature of the operation is now graded as "Secret".

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(A.G.E. Reuse)

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA

COPY: Defense
Supply
Navy
AIF

UK UNCLASSIFIED

BR/79

COPY



UK UNCLASSIFIED *BB* OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA.

24th May, 1955.



Ref: J.743/2

My dear Ken,

Please refer to my letter J.743/2 of yesterday's date in which I undertook to let you have a draft of the financial agreement between the Australian and United Kingdom Governments in connection with the Maralinga project. I now attach the proposed draft.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) A. G. R. Rouse.

UK UNCLASSIFIED *BB*

K. Herde, Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.



UK UNCLASSIFIED *BB*

(A) Task force for construction work
of the 1st and 2nd regions of camp
CANBERRA.

28th April, 1955.

BR/79

UK UNCLASSIFIED *EB*

My dear Ed,

Please refer to my letter No. J.743/2 of the 18th April in which I undertook to furnish you with complete details of the breakdowns for the task force referred to therein.

I now have pleasure in enclosing a detailed list of the personnel requirements for the project.

Yours sincerely,

A.G.R. Rouse.

E.J.B. Foxcroft, Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA, A.C.T.


COPY: Supply
Defence
Newman.

UK UNCLASSIFIED *EB*

Organization of (A)

UK UNCLASSIFIED
and of (B)

Task force for construction work in firing area, operation of camp machinery and vehicle maintenance, Headquarters and domestic support.



2. Officers

Officers	H.Q.	C.E.	E & M.	M.T.	Admin.	Stores	Total
Range Commandant	1						1
Major or Captain	1	1					1
Captain or Subaltern	1(a)	1	1(b)	1		1	5
Quartermaster					1		1
TOTAL	2	2	1	1	1	1	8

(a) Adjutant

(b) E. and M.O. (Technical, Class I).

3. Warrant Officers and Sergeants.

W.Os. & Sergeants.	H.Q.	C.E.	E & M.	M.T.	Admin.	Stores	Total
Warrant Officer	1						1
Staff Sergt.			1(a)	1(b)	1		3
Sergeants		2		1	1(c)	1	5
TOTAL	1	2	1	2	2	1	9

(a) Mechanist E. & M.

(b) Vehicle Mechanic or Armament Artificer Vehicle

(c) Cook.

UK UNCLASSIFIED

Rank and File

2. UK UNCLASSIFIED *BR*

Rank & File	H.Q.	C.E.	E. & M.	M.T.	Admin.	Stores	Total
Corporals or Lance Corporals	1	8	4	3	4	1	21
Sappers or Privates	9	55	22	26	26	12	150
TOTAL	10	63	26	29	30	13	171

For distribution by Trades see paragraph 6.

All Ranks

All Ranks	H.Q.	C.E.	E & M.	M.T.	Admin.	Stores	Total
Officers	2	2	1	1	1	1	8
Warrant Officers and Sergeants	1	2	1	2	2	1	9
Rank and File	10	63	26	29	30	13	171
Total	13	67	28	32	33	15	188

Distribution of Rank and File by Trades (Cont'd.)

UK UNCLASSIFIED 38

Non-Tradesmen	H.Q.	C.E.	E & M.	M.T.	Admin.	Stores	Total
Field Engineers		44(e)					44
For duty as Barmen							
Hygiene Orderlies					3		3
Medical Orderlies					2		2
Messing Orderlies					2		2
Ration Storemen					8(a)		8
Storemen		1		1(f)	4(a)	5(a) (g)	11
General Duties			9		2	6(g)	17
Total non- Tradesmen		45	9	1	22	11	88
Total Rank and File	10	63	26	29	30	13	171

18th April, 1955.

J743/2.

My dear Ed,

Please refer to my letter No. J743/2 of the 30th March giving you information on the requirements of personnel for the Marlinga project. In that letter I undertook to let you have a detailed breakdown of personnel required within the totals given. I have now received a suggested breakdown for the task force referred to in the second paragraph of my letter under reference and of the likely requirements for headquarters and domestic support referred to in the fourth paragraph of the same letter. I attach a summary of the suggested breakdown of personnel required as an Appendix to this letter.

I have been asked to point out that a letter containing complete details of these breakdowns is being sent by bag and I will of course forward to you the information contained therein as soon as it arrives. I am also asked to emphasise that in response to your request for early information on this question the breakdown of the task force has been prepared in advance of final decisions on the numbers and types of tests to be carried out so that minor variations may still have to be made. In addition the details of the personnel required for domestic support will need to be reviewed by the Range Commandant when he is appointed.

Since the despatch of my letter under reference the United Kingdom authorities have received outline plans for the power, sewage and distillation plants in the camp. This led to an increase of eight in the numbers previously given for the electrical and mechanical work due to the requirements for operating this machinery. The civil engineering group has however been reduced by three. I am also requested to point out that the addition of six to the stores group is to allow for numbers required for off-loading etc. at Watson. Ranks and trades have been given in army terms for identification purposes only.

I am also instructed to say that if the Australian authorities accept the commitment of providing the civil engineering group for construction work in the firing areas referred to in paragraph 2 of my letter under reference the United Kingdom authorities would welcome the early appointment of the Officer-in-Charge. They add that it would be helpful and indeed desirable if this officer and the Range Commandant could pay an early visit to the United Kingdom for general briefing on the technical requirements.

The United Kingdom authorities consider that it is not practicable at this stage to provide a breakdown of the care and maintenance force including security guards referred to in paragraph 6 of my letter under reference which will not be required until December 1956. It is suggested that the details of these requirements should be discussed in due course with the Range Commandant.

Finally I would point out that this information does not take into account the question of work in the firing areas by the Kwinana Company which was raised at the meeting on the 12th April in Melbourne and on which I am still awaiting a reply from the United Kingdom authorities.

Yours sincerely,

A. G. R. ROUSE

E. J. B. Foxcroft, Esq.

UK UNCLASSIFIED

Information
in the
used at
which

APPENDIX

UK UNCLASSIFIED *BB*

A. Task force for construction work in firing areas for operation of camp machinery and for vehicle maintenance:

1. Civil Engineering Group:

- 1 Major or Captain in charge of group
- 1 Captain or Subaltern
- 2 Sergeants for field engineering duties
- 1 Blacksmith
- 4 Carpenters
- 4 Concretors
- 1 Plumber
- 5 Steel erectors
- 2 Surveyors
- 1 Welder
- 45 non-tradesmen including
- 6 compressor operators

Total - 2 officers, 2 Sergeants, 63 other ranks

2. Electrical and Mechanical Group:

(a) General Section:

- 1 Officer (Electrically and Mechanically trained)
- 1 Staff Sergeant (Electrically and Mechanically trained)
- 1 Electrician (Maintenance)
- 1 Electrician (Linesman)
- 2 Fitters
- 1 Plumber
- 1 Electrician (Wireman)

Total - 1 Officer, 1 Sergeant, 6 other ranks

(b) Machinery Operations Section:

- 3 Shift Engineers (Electrically and Mechanically trained)
- 3 Electricians (Power station and Switchboard attendants)
- 3 Engineering hands (Internal combustion)
- 1 Engineering fitter (Internal combustion and pumps)
- 1 Refrigerator mechanic
- 9 General duty (Power distillation and Sewerage plant).

Total - 20 other ranks

(c) Motor Transport Section:

- 1 Officer
- 1 Staff Sergeant (Vehicle mechanic)
- 1 Sergeant
- 3 Crane Operators
- 2 Plant Operators
- 15 Drivers
- 1 Electrician (vehicle and plant)
- 2 Fitters
- 2 Storemen (Technical and Petrol, Oil and Lubricants)
- 4 Vehicle Mechanics

Total - 1 Officer, 2 Sergeants, 29 other ranks.

UK UNCLASSIFIED *BB*

Grand Total for Group - 2 Officers, 3 Sergeants,
55 other ranks

B. Personnel for Headquarters and Domestic Support:

1. Headquarters:

- 1 Colonel as Range Commandant
- 1 Captain (Adjutant)
- 1 Warrant Officer
- 4 Clerks
- 6 Telephone Operators

Total - 2 Officers, 1 Warrant Officer, 10 other ranks

2. Administrative Group:

- 1 Quartermaster
- 1 Staff Sergeant
- 1 Sergeant cook
- 8 Cooks
- 22 non-Tradesmen

Total - 1 Officer, 2 Sergeants, 30 other ranks

3. Stores Group:

- 1 Officer
- 1 Sergeant
- 2 Clerks
- 11 non-Tradesmen (including 4 trained as Fork List Truck Drivers)

Total - 1 Officer, 1 Sergeant, 13 other ranks.

NOTE: Civil Engineering Group together with elements of Headquarters and other groups will be required by March 1956. The Electrical and Mechanical group and the personnel of the Domestic and Headquarter support will be required certainly by the end of May 1956 for the handover period of camp machinery and possibly earlier for training. The build-up of the remainder to be made as required by the Range Commandant,

30th March, 1955

Dear Foxcroft,

With reference to our conversation of the 23rd March in which you informed me that the Australian authorities were not in a position to proceed on the question of providing service forces for the Karalinga project until they had received the "precise definition of requirements" referred to in the minutes of the meeting with the Prime Minister on the 10th February last we have now received the following information from London. The C.E.O. regret the delay in furnishing this material which is due to the necessity for deciding on the numbers and types of tests to be carried out before a detailed breakdown of personnel needed for the preparation of the firing areas for 1956 can be given. These details about the numbers and types of tests are not yet finalised.

It is envisaged that the main task of the service force will be to undertake work in the firing areas such as the erection of weapon towers and the installation of instruments and equipment which for security reasons cannot be done by the civilian contractors engaged on the construction of the main range. The approximate total figures required are estimated to be two officers and 68 other ranks for civil engineering work and two officers and 56 other ranks for electrical and mechanical work including generator and transport maintenance. The detailed breakdown of personnel required within these totals should be available within the next month.

E. J. B. Foxcroft, Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,

It will be necessary for this force to start work at Meralunga in March, 1956, but the full number of electrical and mechanical personnel will not be needed until June/July of that year. As the main camp will not be completed before the end of July, 1956, temporary accommodation will ^{HAVE TO} be provided for the force pending the completion of the main camp. The bulk of the force will be required to remain for the duration of the trials to prepare the firing area for each individual test.

During the discussions with Wilson's party in December last I understand that the Australian authorities agreed to provide domestic support for the United Kingdom technical personnel during the period of the trials. The approximate numbers required for this purpose are additional to those given above and are estimated to be :-

- (a) for stores - one quartermaster plus eight
- (b) for domestic duties, e.g. cooks, stewards, etc. - 30 plus six telephone operators
- (c) for general administration - one camp commandant plus six.

The build up of the technical personnel for the trials will not begin before August, 1956 but the United Kingdom authorities would welcome the early appointment of the camp commandant and the quartermaster so that these officers could take part in detailed planning and the organisation of administrative arrangements under the general guidance of the Joint Committee.

The question of the care and maintenance forces during the inter-trial periods which was also referred to at the meeting with the Prime Minister on the 10th February was discussed with the Australian authorities during these talks. It was then agreed that it would be preferable for this to be

provided from service sources so that personnel from the UNITED KINGDOM
over periodically and thus avoid the problems likely to
arise from the long term employment of civilians in such
an isolated locality. It is estimated that about 40/50
men will be required for this task including security guards
which the Australian authorities have, I understand, already
agreed to provide. This force will not be required until
December, 1956.

With regard to the question of cost I understand
that it was suggested to Mr. Menzies during the London talks
that the Federal Government should make a modest contribution
towards the running cost of the project and that the most
appropriate form for such a contribution would be for
Australia to bear the cost of the pay, salaries and wages
of Australian service personnel and Commonwealth employees
provided :-

- (a) for the security duties, meteorological services,
airfield control and domestic support during the
trials
- (b) for the preparation of the firing areas and for
the maintenance of the range during inter-trial
period if these commitments are also accepted.

This was I believe the principle which it was suggested
should be incorporated in the financial provisions of the
Memorandum of Arrangements.

I trust that the above information will enable
you to pursue your discussions with the interested Commonwealth
Departments and no doubt you will be letting me have your views
on these proposals in due course.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) A.G.R. House.

UK UNCLASSIFIED *at*

BR/79

7-3/2
[REDACTED]

My dear Sir,

As promised I now attach three copies of the draft Memorandum of Arrangements.

The C.R.O. have asked us to transmit to you the following comments on the draft. In preparing it they have assumed that as in the case of the Woomera project the Memorandum will not be published. They have also not used legal phraseology in drawing up the provisions of the Memorandum since they envisage that if any question of interpretation should subsequently arise it would be dealt with by negotiation between the two Governments.

Clause 2:

It is intended that the definition of the site should be that given in the Federal Government's Gazette proclaiming the prohibited area. The United Kingdom Authorities would like however to receive confirmation that the proclamation of the prohibited area would include the air space above the site. They also point out that as in the case of previous trials it will be necessary to institute strict control over all flying in the area of the tests and in the vicinity of radioactive cloud following the tests. Perhaps you would confirm that the Australian authorities will be prepared to enforce similar restrictions for future tests.

Clause 9:

During the discussions with the Wilson Mission it was I believe suggested that the Australian authorities should undertake a nationwide survey of

E. J. B. Foneroff, Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,
Canberra, A.C.T.

UK UNCLASSIFIED *at*

background radiation and the United Kingdom offer help in training and the provision of equipment for this purpose. It is now considered that these monitoring stations should form part of the general safety precautions. In this connection as also mentioned in the December talks the necessary equipment can be set up at existing Government posts such as police stations and the taking of measurements does not require skilled personnel.

Clauses 10 & 11:

I believe that on the 2nd March you expressed to Geoffrey Tory the concern of the Australian authorities about the indemnification provision as the prohibited area is very wide and despite precautions there is the possibility that Aborigines might stray into it and be injured. The United Kingdom authorities appreciate these difficulties but point out that it is equally hard from the United Kingdom point of view to agree without qualification to meet claims from unauthorised intruders within the prohibited area. They are, however, ready to consider any proposals by the Australian authorities on this point.

Clause 18:

The United Kingdom authorities consider that the incorporation of the financial arrangements in a separate Memorandum now seems inevitable in view of the further discussions that will have to take place on the points raised with the Prime Minister in London. Such an arrangement follows the pattern of the Woomera Memorandum. As Geoffrey Tory stated in his letter J 743/2 of the 28th February to you the United Kingdom agrees to bear the cost of contractors employed on the construction of the site but it is hoped that the Australian Government will not seek reimbursement for cost of providing Australian

service personnel
with the project, if these
ultimately accepted.
30th Nov

bring this

UK UNCLASSIFIED

service personnel for certain tasks in connection with the project, if these commitments are ultimately accepted. This question was of course referred to in my letter to you No. J 743/2 of the 30th March.

Finally as stated in my letter No. J 743/2 of the 24th March in connection with the Kwinana contract the maximum use of imported materials is being made for this project. In this connection the United Kingdom Government hope that the Federal Government will see their way to waiving import duties on this material and equipment. The hope is also expressed that the Federal Government will be able to either waive or reduce to the absolute minimum the formalities required for the issue of any necessary import licences for these materials.

No doubt you will be letting me have your observations on the draft Memorandum and the abovementioned points in due course.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) Tony Rouse

Facilities - (Canadian) in
to + new collection of
Government of
Windsor

BR/779

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

11 December, 1954

TEMPORARILY DOWNGRADED TO

UK CONFIDENTIAL
FOR TRANSMIT.

Dear Foxcroft,

Shortly before "Totem" the United Kingdom authorities learned that the Canadian Services would have liked to send representatives to the tests, but it was too late then to make any arrangements. It is known that the Canadians are very anxious to participate in future tests, and the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff for their part consider that it would be generally advantageous, subject of course to the agreement of the Australian Government, if they could do so. We have accordingly now been asked to enquire whether this would be agreeable to the Australian Government. We understand that the sort of facilities the Canadian Services might be expected to want are :-

- (a) to add representatives to the scientific groups of the Director of the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment;
- (b) to add some Service officers to Service trial teams;
- (c) to collaborate in our departmental arrangements for the exposing of equipment to test;
- (d) to send their Radio Detection Unit (Royal Canadian Engineers), backed up with personnel from the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force, to take part in radiological survey work, etc.

It is understood that the Canadians would probably offer some contribution to air transport.

If, with the consent of the Australian Government, the United Kingdom authorities are able to

BR/80/2
Sheet 1 of 2

2.

make arrangements for the Canadian services to participate in the trials, they contemplate that a Canadian representative should be invited, when appropriate, to meetings of the Trials Executive in London. We have been asked to say that Australia would naturally be offered the same facilities. Perhaps in your answer you could let me have your Government's observations on this last point. I should explain that it would not be necessary at this stage to reach an immediate decision about the Australian representative who might be nominated to attend such meetings.

I should be grateful if you would let me know as soon as possible whether the Australian Government are prepared to agree that Canadian representatives should be associated with future atomic weapon tests in Australia on the lines suggested.

Yours sincerely,

G. M. TORY.

E. Foxcroft, Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA. A. C. T.

COPY

BR/79 34

UK UNCLASSIFIED *BB*

24th December, 1952.

My dear McKnight,

Will you please refer to your Secret letter of the 14th November (No. 449/12) about certain remarks which were reported to have been made by Professor Martin at an interview with the Press shortly after the Monte Bello test.

2. I arranged for Professor Martin's comments to be conveyed to the appropriate United Kingdom authorities as you requested and I have been asked to inform you that they have been brought to the notice both of the Ministry of Supply and, in particular, of Sir William Penney. Sir William has stated that he was surprised at what had been reported by the Press as being statements made by Professor Martin and that he accepts the latter's explanation without reservation.

3. The matter was, as Professor Martin informed Sir Frederick Shedden, discussed by him with Sir William Penney before Professor Martin left Monte Bello. It was clear to Sir William that Professor Martin could not escape without saying something to the Press and it was agreed that the latter should confine his comments to absolute banalities. It appears from his statement that this is, in fact, what he did.

4. In these circumstances, the United Kingdom authorities concerned would be grateful if you could arrange for Professor Martin to be told that they fully accept the statement which he has made and are in agreement that what he said to the Press was quite harmless. Professor Martin will, of course, appreciate that, because of the high political importance of statements to the Press at the time, the United Kingdom authorities were extremely anxious that no mis-statements should be made.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) BEN COCKRAM

A.D. McKnight Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA.

UK UNCLASSIFIED *BB*

(COPY)

BR/79 X

J743/2.

23rd November, 1954.

UK UNCLASSIFIED

My dear Prime Minister,

I have been asked to convey to you on behalf of the United Kingdom Government an expression of their gratitude for your helpful answer, given in your letter to me of the 25th October, to their approach with regard to the establishment of a permanent atomic weapon proving ground in Australia. They are glad to accept your invitation for a mission to visit Australia and have made arrangements for a party to leave the United Kingdom within the next few days for this country. They would arrive in Sydney on the 28th November and would expect to remain in Australia until the 16th December. The details of this visit are being discussed direct with your advisers and with the Department of Supply in Melbourne.

I have been asked to assure you that the difficulties to which you refer in the penultimate paragraph of your letter are fully understood in the United Kingdom. It is considered that the question of finance cannot be left open for the moment. The first and essential thing is to assess and define the work and problems involved and this will be the primary responsibility of the United Kingdom mission. They will of course deal with such questions as overall costs and labour supply but will not be concerned with financial policy. I should add that they will also deal with outstanding matters concerning the "initiator" tests which it is proposed should be made in Australia in 1955, as already agreed with the Australian authorities.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) STEPHEN L. HOLMES.

Rt. Hon. R.G. Menzies, C.H., G.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

(COPY)
Treasury, Supply, Defence.

Prime Minister's Department.

The Secretary,
Department of Defence,
Victoria Barracks,
St. Kilda Road,
MELBOURNE

Referred for your information.

UK UNCLASSIFIED

(Sgd.) E.J.H. Foxcroft
for (A.S. Brown
Secretary.
24 Nov 1954

BR/79

P.M.'s File No. M.75

UK UNCLASSIFIED
[REDACTED]

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA.

29th September, 1952.

HURRICANE

My dear Brown,

Will you please refer to your letter of the 19th September (M.75) about Professor Martin's attendance at the Atomic Weapon Test.

I have been instructed to inform you that full details of all weapon effects and the layout of the site will be given to Professor Martin. The accommodation position, however, necessitates that all persons attending the test should be allotted definite tasks, and the health physics team was suggested as being related to the field in which Professor Martin is interested. This suggestion was not intended to limit in any way the undertaking that Professor Martin would be given full access to the information mentioned above.

I have also been asked to state that Mr. Butement's attendance is understood by the United Kingdom authorities concerned to be on a similar basis, and that he will no doubt be asked to undertake some task when he joins the party.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) Ben Cockram

A.S. Brown Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA.

UK UNCLASSIFIED
[Signature]

(COPY)

Prime Minister's Department.
11th Sept. 1952.

The Secretary,
Department of Defence.

Referred.

(Sgd.) A.D. McKnight.
for A.S. Brown.
Secretary

BR/79

UK UNCLASSIFIED

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
Canberra.

10th September, 1952.

EPICURE.

Dear Sir,

I am directed by the Acting High Commissioner to refer to your letter dated the 5th September, reference 449/12, about publicity arrangements in connection with the atomic weapon test.

I understand that the Admiralty have already communicated to the United Kingdom Service Liaison Staff details of the machinery for the issue of a simultaneous communique announcing a successful explosion including the use of a code word. It is understood that the Australian authorities in Melbourne have been informed accordingly by the U.K.C.L.S. and know the code word.

The intention is that the code word would be signalled by the Flag Officer, Special Squadron, direct to the Admiralty and to the Australian Navy Board. This would be the signal for the immediate release in the United Kingdom and Australia of a communique in agreed terms.

Subject to the concurrence of the Australian Government, the United Kingdom authorities propose that this communique should be as follows:-

"A British atomic weapon has been successfully exploded in the Monte Bello Islands."

I am to say that the United Kingdom authorities have not told the Press anything about these arrangements.

I should be most grateful to be informed whether the Commonwealth authorities concur in the text proposed above.

Yours faithfully,

(Sgd.) G. Davey.

A.S. Brown, Esq.,
Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA.

UK UNCLASSIFIED

(COPY)

HURRICANE

UK UNCLASSIFIED

BR/79
Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom.
Canberra.

9th September, 1952.

Dear Alan,

I wrote to you on the 27th August saying that the United Kingdom authorities would like to invite Professor Martin to join the Health Physics Team at Monte Bello. You agreed that Captain Hutchinson might make an informal approach to Professor Martin on this subject.

I understand that when Captain Hutchinson spoke to Professor Martin, the latter was favourably disposed, although he pointed out the need for him to be away from the University for the shortest possible time, and that he would not be able to cancel engagements until the end of November. Professor Martin's informal reply was reported to the United Kingdom authorities by Captain Hutchinson from Melbourne.

This reply has now been considered by the United Kingdom authorities who are willing to proceed but, on security grounds and because of the position vis a vis Professor Titterton, it is thought that Professor Martin's attendance should be treated as secret until after the explosion. This would supersede the relevant part of paragraph 6 of my letter of the 27th August.

Subject, therefore, to the agreement of the Commonwealth authorities the United Kingdom authorities say that a formal invitation may now be extended to Professor Martin. They hope, of course, that they will have the full co-operation of Professor Martin and of the Australian authorities concerned in maintaining secrecy regarding his movements until the information can be safely disclosed.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) George Davey.

A. D. McKnight, Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA.

UK UNCLASSIFIED

Prime Minister's Department,
Canberra. A.C.T.

9th September, 1952.

The Secretary,
Department of Defence.

Referred.

UK UNCLASSIFIED *BS*

(Sgd.) A.S. Brown,
Secretary.

HURRICANE

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
Canberra.

8th September, 1952.

Dear Alan,

You wrote to Cockram on the 25th August, your reference 449/12 enquiring whether in the circumstances now existing in Australia it would not be better to tell the press exactly what arrangements are contemplated for the release to them of the news that the actual explosion has taken place.

The United Kingdom authorities reply that they have no objection to the Australian authorities telling the press that an announcement that the atomic weapon test in Monte Bello has taken place will be made simultaneously in London and Melbourne and that every endeavour will be made to ensure that as far as possible the subsequent release of information will be made available to the press in Australia at the same time as the release in London.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) George Davey.

A.D. McKnight, Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA.

Distribution: 1 - Minister for Defence.
2 - 6 copies to Department of Defence.

UK UNCLASSIFIED *BS*

The Secretary,
Department of Defence.

1st September, 1952.

Referred for information.

BR/79

(Sgd) A.S. BROWN
Secretary

UK UNCLASSIFIED

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
CANBERRA.

29th August, 1952.

Dear Mr. McKnight,

Will you please refer to previous correspondence about the forthcoming atomic weapon test?

The United Kingdom authorities have reported that the United States authorities have told them that some days after the explosion (and in that connection) one of their B.29 aircraft will carry out meteorological flights from Kwajalein. Their aircraft may have to fly at extreme range to intercept the clouds and in certain conditions of wind and weather emergency landings at Melbourne, Auckland and Nandi might be necessary for refuelling or repairs.

The American authorities intend that their representatives in Australia and New Zealand should approach the Australian and New Zealand Departments of External Affairs with a detailed request in regard to this proposal and they wish to be able to do this in Canberra before Colonel Daum, now visiting Canberra on other business, leaves for the United States at the end of this week.

The United Kingdom authorities have asked that the Australian and New Zealand authorities should first be warned of the contemplated approach by the United States and wish in particular to ascertain if it will be appropriate for the American authorities to approach the Department of External Affairs as they propose. The United Kingdom High Commissioner in Wellington has been asked to make a similar approach to the New Zealand authorities.

I have been asked to make it clear that these developments do not mean that the United States Government have been taken into the confidence of the United Kingdom with regard to "Hurricane".

I should be grateful for your comments as urgently as possible.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) G.S. WHITEHEAD

A.D. McKnight Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department.

UK UNCLASSIFIED

(COPY)

UK UNCLASSIFIED

Office of the High Commissioner
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
CANBERRA.

BR/79

HURRICANE

27th August, 1952

Dear Alan,

We had an informal word yesterday about Hurricane.

I said that during his visit to Australia Dr. Penney would be going to Woomera to study a site which might be suitable technically for further atomic weapon trials. The main problem is likely to be health safety and health safety (at 100 to 500 miles distance) needs careful study. It is suggested that it would be very helpful if Dr. Penney could have the support of an Australian scientist on this aspect and that the best man would be Professor Martin of Melbourne University and Scientific Adviser to the Australian Department of Defence.

The United Kingdom authorities would like to invite Professor Martin to join the Health Physics Team at Monte Bello where he would be given full details of all weapons effects and the lay-out of the site. The intention is that he would be one of the Health Monitors and would also work with the meteorologists plotting the movement of the radio active cloud. He would not be given any access to the weapon itself nor to the results of the measurements of the weapons functioning.

It is hoped this suggestion would appeal to the Australian authorities since it would give Australia additional participation in the Monte Bello trial and would also provide you with someone of your own to whom you could turn for expert advice when Dr. Penney reports on the technical feasibility of the Woomera region for future tests. The United Kingdom authorities say that they assume that Professor Martin is appropriately covered by the Official Secrets Act, etc.

You said that you would mention this to the Prime Minister, but that meanwhile on an informal basis there would be no objection to Captain Hutchinson approaching Professor Martin informally.

The United Kingdom authorities recognise that the Australian authorities may wish to announce Professor Martin's participation. If so, they would have no objection provided

(a) the phraseology was the same as that used in the draft Press announcement about Professor Titterton enclosed with your letter of 12th August, and

(b) that the considerations set out in paragraph 3 of Cockram's letter dated 8th August to Allen Brown relating to Professor Titterton's movements are also observed.

The United Kingdom authorities ask that the proviso mentioned at (b) above should be brought to Professor Martin's notice.

Yours sincerely,

(SGD) GEORGE DAVEY.

A.D. McKnight, Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

Received etc of Memo for PM's Dept Dated 11/9/52 for early advice.

UK UNCLASSIFIED

					UK UNCLASSIFIED	1	(a) Incl. 1 Corporal or Lance Corporal
						4	
	4(a)					4	
Foremen		4(a)			2	6	(b) Inc. 1 Corporal & 1 Butcher.
Welders				8(b)		4	
Electrician Generator			3			8	(c) Switch Board Attendants
Drivers for Vehicles			15(a)			3	
Electrician Maintenance		1				15	(d) Technical Cl. III Cpls. or L/Cpls.
Electrician Sewer		1				1	(e) Incl. 4 Cpls. or L/Cpls.
Electrician Power Station		3(c)				1	Incl. 6 trained as compressor Operators.
Electrician Elect. & Plant			1			3	
Electrician Sewer		1				1	(f) POL Storemen
Line Hand		3				1	
Line Fitter & Pumps		1				3	(g) 2 to b3 trained as Fork Life Truck Drivers.
Driver		2(a)	2			1	
Generator			2			4	
Member & Electric Fitter	1	1				2	
Refrigerator Mechanic		1				1	
Electrician Engineer		3(d)				3	
Electrician Motor	5(a)					5	
Electrician Technical			1(a)			1	
Conveyor Logistical	2					2	
Telephone Operator	6					6	
Electrician Mechanic			4(a)			4	
Operator	1					1	
Technical Aidsmen	10	18	17	28	8	2	83

UK UNCLASSIFIED *AS*

B/79

(COPY)

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA.

27th April, 1956.

J804/1


Sir,

I am directed by the High Commissioner to refer to previous correspondence about full scale atomic tests in the Pacific (our reference J804/1) and to inform you that the code name for the operation (Grapple) is now unclassified and may be used freely. The nature of the operation is now graded as "Secret".


I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(A.G.E. Reuss)

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA

COPY: Defense
Supply
Navy
AIP

UK UNCLASSIFIED *AS*


UK UNCLASSIFIED

BR/79

J.804/1

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA.

24th April, 1956.

Sir,

I am directed by the High Commissioner to refer to his letter No. J.804/1 of today's date to the Prime Minister about full scale atomic tests in the Pacific. In that letter the High Commissioner said that we shall be sending to you as soon as possible an indication of the scale of naval requirements for the operation. In the meantime the High Commissioner has asked me to put the following to you.

The United Kingdom Admiralty are investigating the best method of fulfilling a requirement to lay moorings at Malden and Christmas Islands.

It is understood that there are two possible methods of providing a ship from R.N. resources. The first is to tow out a "moor" class ship and the second is to modify a salvage vessel for laying moorings. Neither of these alternatives is, however, very satisfactory. Moreover all R.N. bar vessels are unsuitable because they are coal-fired.

It would be much appreciated by the United Kingdom authorities if the R.A.N. could look into the possibility of providing a mooring vessel for this task complete with crew. It is understood that an oil-fired bar type ship with adequate endurance might be available.

It may also be thought desirable to escort a bar ship during the ocean passage to the area. Moreover Malden Island is isolated and uninhabited. It is, therefore, considered essential that a bar ship should be supported during the mooring operation, possibly by a frigate or destroyer. The United Kingdom authorities wondered whether the R.A.N. would be in a position to provide this supporting ship also.

Supplies of oil fuel and provisions would be available at Christmas Island. The moorings concerned, which are in some cases of special design, will be made up in the United Kingdom and could be shipped out for loading at Christmas Island.

The mooring vessel would be required in the area by mid-October of this year and the time needed for laying at both Islands is estimated at some two or three months. The question of recovery of the moorings has not yet been fully considered, but if recovery were required this would not be before August, 1957.

The High Commissioner would be glad to know whether the R.A.N. would, if formally requested, be prepared to make a bar ship and escorting ship available. In transmitting this enquiry to you the High Commissioner has asked me to point out that if a formal request were submitted to you, the United Kingdom authorities would, of course, be willing to discuss the financial implications.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(A.G.R. Rouse)

The Secretary,
Prime Minister's Department

UK UNCLASSIFIED

Tests with service personnel
COPY:

BR/79

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,
CANBERRA.

J806/1

UK UNCLASSIFIED
SB

19th April, 1955.

My Dear Sir,

Please refer to Geoffrey Tory's Top Secret letter to you of the 11th March which referred to the setting up of an interdepartmental executive in the United Kingdom for the co-ordination of the atomic weapons trials in 1956.

We have now heard from the United Kingdom authorities that they are anxious to carry out the following test with service personnel.

It is considered that since few service personnel have witnessed an atomic explosion or have any realisation of its effects every opportunity should be taken to spread the confidence which comes from personal experience and to dispel the fear of the unknown. The United Kingdom authorities consider that subject to approval by the Australian authorities, advantage should be taken of "Buffalo" to start indoctrination of service personnel on as full a scale as is practicable.

It is not possible to state what scale would be practicable until joint service planning has been carried out with the Australian authorities but it is thought that the major limiting factors are likely to be as follows :-

- (a) availability of air lift
- (b) availability of air bases in Australia
- (c) accommodation etc. facilities at selected air bases
- (d) airfield and administrative facilities, particularly water, which can be made available at hardings without interfering with A.F.R.E.'s requirements
- (e) medical arrangements; health physics and
- (f) financial.

I have been asked to point out that the above proposals has been approved in principle and if the Australian authorities are agreeable, the United Kingdom authorities are anxious to discuss possibilities and details direct with the Australian services. In this connection it is assumed that the Australian Government may wish to carry out similar exercises for their service personnel.

I should be grateful if you would inform me at your earliest convenience whether the Australian authorities agree in principle to the carrying out of these tests.

Yours sincerely,

A.G.R. ROUSE

H.J.E. Foxcroft, Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA. A. C. T.

UK UNCLASSIFIED
SB

COPY: Defence, Supply
Defence Division, Treasury.

UK UNCLASSIFIED

14th October, 1955.

BR/79

Dear Mr. Herde,

We have today been informed by telegraph that the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority wish to carry out a further series of "Kittens" trials at Maralinga, starting in March, 1956. This would be after the Australian service task force had moved into the area. There would be eighteen tests of the same nature as those carried out in May to July in this year. This means that, except for some variations in the permitted firing area to take account of the occupation of the range at the time, the safety aspects are covered by the document "The scope and radiological hazards of Kittens, 1955", of which I sent copies to Foxcroft in my letter of the 19th February of this year. This was as you know considered and approved by the Australian Government in connection with this year's tests.

The possibility of this request for trials was anticipated and was discussed with a representative of the Maralinga Committee and the Commandant of Maralinga who lately visited the United Kingdom. No difficulties were foreseen in providing all that would be required for the tests.

As for the previous series, the full cost of the trials and safety arrangements would be borne by the United Kingdom Government.

We should be grateful if you would let us know whether the Australian Government agree to the carrying out of these trials. The necessary facilities would be on the same lines as for this year's trials and if your Government see no objection to what is proposed a detailed plan of the exact requirements will be forwarded.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd). AGR. Rouse,

K.H. Herde, Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA.

COPY - Supply Trsry Defence
Defence Treasury

UK UNCLASSIFIED

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

The Secretary,
Department of Defence.
.....

Referred for favour of your advice.

(Sgd.) A.S. Brown,
Secretary.

Task Force for construction work
MEMORANDUM ON REQUIREMENTS AT
MARALINGA IN 1957

UK UNCLASSIFIED

BR/79

The United Kingdom Government are considering proposals for a further series of trials which they may wish, subject to the consent of the Australian Government, to carry out at Maralinga in 1957 in addition to the T.I.M. trials to which the consent of the Australian Government has already been sought. It may be late this year before they will be in a position to put forward firm proposals, but they think that the Australian Government should have some advance information of the programme to which their agreement may later be sought.

2. The present plans are that there might be up to five tower tests in which there would be no target response measurements. Firing would take place in the latter half of 1957. The scientific party would be smaller than that provided for the forthcoming tests in 1956. The Australian Safety Committee would, of course, have to satisfy itself about the safety aspects of any proposed firings.

3. The United Kingdom would very greatly welcome a repetition of the arrangements which are operating so well for the present series of tests whereby the Task Force of Australian Service personnel has undertaken the work of operating the range, building the firing areas and supplying headquarters and domestic support. This arrangement seems to the United Kingdom Government to be the most suitable for an operation of this kind in a remote part of Australian Territory and to provide the most economical use of manpower and other joint resources. "Civilianisation" of the force in whole or part would lead to serious difficulties and expense. The help of the present Australian Service Task Force has been invaluable.

4. It is now evident, however, from investigations of which the Australian Atomic Weapons Test Committee are aware, that the programme contemplated would require substantially more servicemen than were needed for "Operation Buffalo" when everything was new and the contractors were on the site. After thorough examination by Sir William Penney and Captain Lloyd with the Range Commandant, United Kingdom Ministry of Supply Staff and Atomic Weapons Research Establishment staff, it has been found that the lowest figures to work to in 1957 are:

	323	
Basic staff	228	95
Preparation phase for major trials	354	(increase on basic staff - 126)
Operational phase	400	(increment on basic staff - 172)

5. The United Kingdom Government recognise that the new manpower figures present a greater problem than in 1956 and may make it more difficult for the Australian Government again to provide the whole force. The United Kingdom Government recognise that it may, therefore, be necessary for them to

UK UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]
UK UNCLASSIFIED *ab*

2.

consider methods of supplementing whatever force the Australian Government may agree to provide under paragraph 4(c) of the Memorandum of Financial Arrangements and would welcome an indication of the numbers and "trades" the Australian Government would feel able to contribute and their views on the best solution of the problems associated with raising the required total force.

6. If there are to be both major and minor trials in 1957, it would not be possible to manage with less than the figure shown for basic staff except possibly for a few weeks in December, 1956, and January, 1957, and if the Australian Government could in the meantime, as a provisional measure agree not immediately to reduce their Service Force at Maralinga at the conclusion of the present series of tests, the United Kingdom Government would be most grateful.

Office of the High Commissioner for the
United Kingdom,
CANBERRA.

20th September, 1956.

FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM.
CANBERRA.

Ref. J.743/2

19th August, 1955.

UK UNCLASSIFIED

BR/79

My dear Ken,

Please refer to your letter No.449/23 of the 4th July giving the views of the Australian authorities on the draft Financial Agreement in connection with the Maralinga project. The amendments suggested by the Australian Government have been examined by the United Kingdom authorities who would like to submit for your consideration the following comments.

The United Kingdom authorities agree to the amendment proposed in Paragraph 2 (a) of your letter under reference and for the sake of conformity suggest that the words "and maintaining" should also be inserted in the title of the Memorandum after the word "establishing".

The United Kingdom authorities appreciate the reasons for the suggested amendment in Paragraph 2(b) of your letter. They consider, however, that the inclusion in a formal agreement of figures, which are at best only estimates, is inappropriate. Moreover, since two of the figures relate specifically to "Buffalo" it would in any event seem undesirable to insert them in a formal Memorandum of Financial Arrangements for a permanent proving ground. If, however, the Australian authorities feel strongly on this matter, it is suggested that the figures be made the subject of a separate annex to the Memorandum which could read as follows:-

"It is agreed that the liability of the Australian Government for providing service personnel for the tasks described in Paragraph 4 (c) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the Memorandum of Financial Arrangements is at present limited to the following numbers which are estimates based on the scale of trials as at present forseen:-

4 (c) (i) Village and firing areas - 127;

4 (c) (ii) Administration and domestic support during trials - 61;

4 (c) (iii) Care and maintenance between trials. - 40-50"

The United Kingdom authorities agree to your proposed amendment in Paragraph 2 (c) of your letter, but suggest the insertion of the word "significant" in the new Paragraph 5 after the words "rendered without".

The suggested amendments given in Paragraphs 2(d) and (e) of your letter are accepted.

K.H. Hordo, Esq.,
Prime Minister's Department,
CANBERRA. A.C.T.

UK UNCLASSIFIED

2. UK UNCLASSIFIED *BR*

No doubt you will inform me in due course of the views of the Australian authorities on the above-mentioned proposals.

Yours sincerely,

TONY ROUSE.

COPY: Defence
Supply
Treasury
Newman.

UK UNCLASSIFIED *BR*

PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTMENT.

447/23

The Secretary,
Department of Defence.

Forwarded for your information.

(A.S. Brown)
Secretary.
22/8/1955